Xii. Trade Regulation by unknown
Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 34 | Issue 2 Article 16
Spring 3-1-1977
Xii. Trade Regulation
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University School of Law
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation




The Kielwien decision is in accord with a number of cases 6 which
hold that the burden of proving "newly discovered evidence" or "in-
tervening facts" is on the plaintiff, and, absent a clear showing of
such facts or evidence, the plaintiff will be limited in recovery to the
amount of his administrative claim. The rationale underlying this
requirement of strict compliance with the Tort Claims Act is that the
United States should be sued only on its own terms when it has
waived sovereign immunity." Those terms are jurisdictional; where
they are not strictly complied with by the plaintiff, the federal courts
have no jurisdiction over the action. 8 The court must therefore re-
quire the plaintiff to prove the intervening facts or newly discovered
evidence which entitles him to recover more than his prior admin-
istrative claim. The Fourth Circuit indicated in Kielwien that
§ 2675(b) should not be construed liberally. Where the plaintiff
fails to make a clear showing of intervening facts or newly discovered




A. No Expansion of Collateral Estoppel for Administrative
Hearing
The doctrine of collateral estoppel prevents a party to a lawsuit
from retrying issues which have already been litigated and deter-
mined in a previous suit in which it was a party.' In early applications
540 F.2d at 681.
See, e.g., Schwartz v. United States, 446 F.2d 1380, 1381 (3rd Cir. 1971); De-
Groot v. United States, 384 F. Supp. 1178, 1181 (N.D. Iowa 1974); Bonner v. United
States, 339 F. Supp. 640, 650 n.5 (E.D. La. 1972); Smith v. United States, 239 F. Supp.
152, 154 (D. Md. 1965); Rudd v. United States, 233 F. Supp. 730, 734 (M.D. Ala. 1964).
n See Rosario v. Am.-Export-Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 531 F.2d 1227, 1230-31 (3rd
Cir. 1976); Childers v. United States, 442 F.2d 1299, 1303 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 857 (1971); Mayer v. Wright, 251 F.2d 178, 179 (9th Cir. 1958); Story v. Snyder,
184 F.2d 454, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
-m See United States v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co. 309 U.S. 506, 514 (1940); Mayer
v. Wright, 251 F.2d 178, 179 (9th Cir. 1958); Simon v. United States, 244 F.2d 703,
704 (5th Cir. 1957).
Collateral estoppel refers to the res judicata effect which a law suit has on a
second suit based on a different cause of action but involving issues necessarily decided
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of the doctrine, federal courts refused to bind a litigant to the findings
of an earlier suit unless his opponent were also bound.' This rule of
mutuality,3 however, has been substantially overruled in recent
years.' In applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the courts now
inquire whether the litigant to be estopped had a "full and fair oppor-
tunity"5 to be heard on the issue.' If the litigant has had this oppor-
tunity, he may be estopped from litigating the issue again.
Application of this "full and fair opportunity" test to administra-
in the prior action. See Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Found.,
402 U.S. 313 (1971); Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351 (1876); Ritchie v. Landau,
475 F.2d 151 (2d Cir. 1973); 1B MooRE's FEDERAL PRAcTca, 0.412[1], at 1805-1808
(2d ed. 1974); RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 68(1) (1942); Scott, Collateral Estoppel
by Judgment, 56 H~Av. L. REv. 1 (1942); Note, Developments in the Law ResJudicata,
65 H~Av. L. REv. 820 (1952).
2 E.g., Triplett v. Lowell, 297 U.S. 638 (1936); Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. City of
Newport, 247 U.S. 464 (1918); Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting
Co., 225 U.S. 111 (1912).
3 Where one party to an action moves for collateral estoppel to bind the other
party to an issue determined in a prior action, the doctrine of mutuality would man-
date that both litigants would have to have been parties or in privity with a party to
the prior action in order for collateral estoppel to apply. The practical result is that
neither party is bound unless both are bound.
Courts discarded the mutuality requirement due to recognition that it wasted
judicial effort to relitigate an issue previously decided in a full and fair trial. E.g.,
Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 328
(1971); Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934 (1964);
Bernhard v. Bank of Amer. Nat'l. Trust & Say. Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892
(1942).
1 Under the "full and fair opportunity" test, the court must decide if a certain
issue was determined in a prior action which provided all procedural safeguards and
definitively ruled on the issue. The courts look to several different areas to test what
is a "full and fair opportunity" to be heard on an issue. See, e.g., Blonder-Tongue
Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 333 (1971) (no opportunity
to choose defendant, forum, and time of suit is unfair); James Talcott, Inc. v. Allaha-
bad Bank, Ltd., 444 F.2d 451, 461-62 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971) (lack
of initiative in bringing suit, defending relatively small claim, no opportunity to choose
or change forum may be considered); Brightheart v. McKay, 420 F.2d 242, 245 n.4
(D.C. Cir. 1969) (litigating small claim, lack of initiative in bringing suit). Although
collateral estoppel was originally applied only defensively, several jurisdictions now
apply it offensively as well. E.g., Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944, 954-56 (2d Cir.
1964); United States v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 709, 725-30 (E.D. Wash.
1962), aff'd as to resjudicata sub noam. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379,
404-05 (9th Cir. 1964); B.R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 225 N.E.2d 195, 278
N.Y.S. 2d 596 (1967); King v. Grindstaff, 284 N.C. 348, 200 S.E.2d 799 (1973).
1 The interests of judicial economy are subordinated in cases where precluding
relitigation of issues would be unfair to the party estopped. See Blonder-Tongue Labo-
ratories, Inc. v. University of ll. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 328 (1971); Ritchie v. Landau,
475 F.2d 151, 155 (2d Cir. 1973).
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tive proceedings is unsettled, however, especially in the area of anti-
trust. Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act7 governs the estoppel effect of
prior antitrust suits brought by the government. The section provides
that a final judgment rendered in any civil or criminal proceedings
brought by or on behalf of the United States under the antitrust laws
shall be prima facie evidence only, and not res judicata, against the
defendant in any action or proceeding brought by any other party as
to issues decided in the prior case.'
The Federal Trade Commission Act, (FTCA), governing unfair
trade practices,9 has been held not to be an antitrust law."° As a
result, the courts have denied prima facie effect to an FTC judgment
under the Federal Trade Commission Act." Nevertheless, an FTC
order entered under § 2(a) of the Clayton Act, 12 an antitrust law, has
been deemed to have prima facie effect.' 3 Presumptively, an FTC
order under the Clayton Act must be accorded only prima facie effect
while FTC orders under the FTCA may carry no weight in subsequent
proceedings.
In North Carolina v. Chas. Pfizer & Co.," the Fourth Circuit ruled
that an FTC determination under § 5 of the FTCA that a patent was
7 15U.S.C.§ 16(a) (1970). See Shores, Treble Damage Antitrust Suits; Admissibil-
ity of Prior Judgments Under Section 5 of the Clayton Act, 54 IowA L. REv. 434 (1968).
Comment, Section 5(a) Of The Clayton Act And The Use Of Collateral Estoppel By
A Private Plaintiff In A Treble Damage Action, 8 U.S.F.L. REV. 74 (1973).
a Section 5 defines the term estoppel narrowly in identifying the circumstances
in which the decree is to be admissible as prima facie evidence. The judgment is
admissible only if it would be an estoppel if the government were bringing the subse-
quent suit. See Comment, The Use of Government Judgments in Private Antitrust
Litigation: Clayton Act Section 5(a), Collateral Estoppel, and Jury Trial, 43 U. Cm.
L. REv. 338 (1976).
' In 1938 Congress enacted the Wheeler-Lea amendment to the FTCA which
officially legitimatized the FTC's authority to regulate deceptive practices regardless
of anti-competitive effect. Clayton Act, ch. 49, § 3, 52 Stat. 111 (1938) (Current version
at 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970). Later, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1958) (current version at 15 U.S.C.
§ 45 (1970)) provided that unfair methods of competition in commerce and unfair
deceptive acts or practices in commerce are unlawful. See Millstein, The Federal
Trade Commission and False Advertising, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 439 (1964).
is See Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co., 355 U.S. 353, 376 (1958); Y&Y Popcorn
Supply Co. v. ABC Vending Corp., 263 F. Supp. 709, 712-13 (E.D. Pa. 1967). Section
5 of the Clayton Act, which empowers the FTC to proscribe unfair competition and
deceptive acts in commerce, is by statutory definition not an antitrust law. 15 U.S.C.
§§ 12, 44 (1970).
1 E.g., Y&Y Popcorn Supply Co. v. ABC Vending Corp., 263 F. Supp. 709,713
(E.D. Pa. 1967).
22 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (1970).
13 Farmington Dowel Prod. Co. v. Forster Mfg. Co., 421 F.2d 61, 67 (1st Cir. 1970).
" 537 F.2d 67 (4th Cir.); cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 183 (1976).
1977]
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fraudulently obtained would not have collateral estoppel effect in a
subsequent private antitrust action against the same party. The court
reasoned that although the prior FTC adjudication was fair, the pro-
cedural requirements of an FTC hearing and a court trial were suffi-
ciently different to justify not applying collateral estoppel effect to
the FTC order. 5 The court further noted that the two actions arose
under different statutes concerning enforcement of different policies"
and that § 5(a) limited the effect of the prior action under the anti-
trust laws to rebuttable and not a conclusive presumption.
In Pfizer,.the state of North Carolina" brought an antitrust dam-
age action against defendants alleging that defendants had entered
into combinations, agreements, and conspiracies unreasonably to re-
strain trade and commerce in the broad spectrum antibiotic market
by using a patent obtained through fraud.2 The plaintiff moved for
summary judgment on the issue that the patent had in fact been
issued because of defendant's fraud, arguing that a prior FTC deter-
mination2 on the issue brought under § 5 of the FTCA should now
estop the defendants from denying this charge.
The plaintiff argued that the holding of Blonder-Tongue Labora-
tories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation2 was dispositive of the
1 Id. at 74.
" Id. at 71.
' Id. at 70.
" North Carolina institued the action on behalf of itself, its governmental subdivi-
sions and all citizen consumers who had purchased broad-spectrum antibiotics manu-
factured and sold by the defendants in North Carolina during the period 1952 to 1966.
Id. at 68.
", The defendants were Chas. Pfizer & Co. (Pfizer), American Cyanamid Com-
pany (Cyanamid), Bristol-Myers Company (Bristol), Olin Mathieson Chemical Cor-
portion (Squibb) and the Upjohn Company (Upjohn). Id. at 69.
21 The enforcement of a patent obtained by intentional fraud upon the Patent
Office may be a violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970), if all other
elements of a § 2 offense are proven. See F.T.C. v. Motion Picture Advert. Serv. Co.,
344 U.S. 392 (1953); Union Circulation Co. v. F.T.C., 241 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1957). If
the violation is established, an injured private party has a treble damage action under
the Clayton Act. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970). See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach.
& Chem. Co., 382 U.S. 172 (1965); Smith, Fraud Upon the Patent Office As a Violation
of the Sherman Antitrust Law, 53 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y. 337, 360 (1971).
11 American Cyanamid Co., 3 TRADE RFG. REP. (CCH) 18,077 (F.T.C. 1967),
aff'd sub nom., Chas. Pfizer & Co. v. F.T.C., 401 F.2d 574 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 920 (1969). The FTC held that the totality of the patentee's actions amounted
to a violation of the FTCA because of the fraudulent effect of the misrepresentations
to the Patbnt Office. The Commission remedied the noncompetitive situation by order-
ing Pfizer to license the patent at a limited royalty to all drug manufacturers.
- 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
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issue. In Blonder-Tongue, the Supreme Court gave collateral estoppel
effect to a prior determination of the invalidity of a patent to foreclose
a plaintiff from litigating alleged infringement of the patent pre-
viously declared invalid.Y The district court in Pfizer rejected this
argument,2 noting the validity of the patent was not directly in issue,
and that, therefore, the holding in Blonder-Tongue was inapplicable.
The Fourth Circuit affirmed this rationale, but ruled nevertheless
that the plaintiffs' motion should still be considered in light of the
fundamental change and development of the doctrine of collateral
estoppel reviewed in the Blonder-Tongue opinion.2
In its review of these changes, the Fourth Circuit held that the
doctrine of collateral estoppel, liberated from the mutuality require-
ment, was typified by Eisel v. Columbia Packing Co.21 In Eisel, the
federal district court of Massachusetts ruled that the decisive ques-
tion when collateral estoppel is asserted against a party is whether
that party had a fair opportunity procedurally, substantively, and
evidentially to litigate the issue in a prior adjudication.?
In considering whether the FTC hearing afforded the defendant
in Pfizer a fair opportunity to litigate the fraud issue, the Fourth
Circuit examined four different areas. First, the court noted that the
FTC hearing was brought under the FTCA, a statute broader in scope
than the antitrust statute under which this case was brought.? Sec-
tion 57 of the FTCAI deals with "unfair methods of competition,"
while the Sherman Act concerns restraints of trade having monopolis-
tic tendencies. While private causes of action may not be brought
under the FTCA, which is concerned with public interest actions,"
" The issue in Blonder-Tongue was the validity of patent vel non, challenged on
the grounds of 'obviousness,' 402 U.S. at 314-15.
21 384 F. Supp. 265, 277 n. 16 (E.D.N.C. 1974).
21 537 F.2d at 73. The history of the doctrine of collateral estoppel was discussed
in the Blonder-Tongue opinion, 402 U.S. at 317-49.
21 181 F. Supp. 298 (D. Mass. 1960).
" Id. at 301. This test jettisoned the previous standard of whether there was
mutuality between the parties. See notes 3, 4 supra. The Fourth Circuit adopted the
Eisel rationale in Graves v. Associated Transp. Inc., 344 F.2d 894, 900 (4th Cir. 1965),
where it held that the plaintiff, having had a full and fair day in court, ought not be
permitted to relitigate the issues previously tried and determined.
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. V 1975), provides that any
combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce is illegal. Section 2 of the
Sherman Act, id. § 2, provides that any person-found to be so monopolizing trade
or commerce shall be guilty of a felony.
" 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1970), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (Supp. V 1975). See
note 10 supra.
' See Pep Boys-Manny, Moe & Jack, Inc. v. FTC, 122 F.2d 158, 161 (3d Cir. 1941).
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private suits may be brought under the antitrust laws when an indi-
vidual can show economic harm through monopolistic practices.3' In
keeping with its policy of discouraging practices tending to restrain
trade, the FTCA concerns itself with the effects of certain practices,
such as misleading statements inducing the issuance of a patent,
regardless of intent. In contrast, to base a claim of a violation of the
antitrust laws on fraudulent inducement of the issuance of a patent,
the plaintiff must show an intent to commit the fraud.3 The Fourth
Circuit concluded that the FTC could have found Pfizer guilty of
practices in obtaining its patent that would not be violations of the
Sherman Act.3 The court held that application of collateral estoppel
where two cases arise under different statutes34 with different policies
behind them, would violate due process.3
Secondly, the court noted that the terms of § 5(e) of the FTCA
appeared to be incompatible with the doctrine of collateral estoppel. "6
This section provides that FTC orders under the FTCA will not ab-
solve any party from any liability under the antitrust acts. Since an
FTC order under the FTCA could not absolve a party from liability
for their acts, the court interpreted this to mean that the government
could relitigate under the Sherman or Clayton Acts an issue earlier
decided against it in a § 5 FTC proceeding. 37 In view of this interpre-
tation, the court reasoned that to deny a respondent the right to
defend on the same issues litigated in a § 5 proceeding in a subse-
quent antitrust suit brought by a plaintiff who was not even a party
to the administrative proceeding would be extremely unfair.38
The third reason for the Fourth Circuit's holding was that § 5(a)
of the Clayton Act provides that a final judgment tendered in any
proceeding brought by or on behalf of the United States under the
antitrust laws39 shall be prima facie evidence against the defendant
3' 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
32 See note 21 supra. United States v. Huck Mfg. Co., 214 F. Supp. 776, 778 (E.D.
Mich. 1963) aff'd 382 U.S. 191 (1965).
3 537 F.2d at 74.
31 Cf. Pacific Seafarers, Inc. v. Pacific Far East Line, Inc., 404 F.2d 804 (D.C. Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1093 (1969) (determination by Federal Maritime Com-
mission not collateral estoppel as to Sherman Act violation).
537 F.2d at 74. See K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT, § 18.04 (3d ed. 1972).
537 F.2d at 74. Section 5(e) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 457 (1970), provides: "No
order of the Commission or judgment of court to enforce the same shall in anywise
relieve or absolve any person, partnership, or corporation from any liability under the
Antitrust Acts."
3 537 F.2d at 74.
SId.
3' See note 8 supra.
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in any other proceeding." The court reasoned that an FTC judgment
could not be both prima facie and conclusive evidence.4' Since .a
judicial determination in an action under the Sherman Act was lim-
ited to only prima facie effect, it would be paradoxical to accord an
FTCA § 5 administrative proceeding the absolute effect of collateral
estoppel.
Finally, the court considered the differences between the proce-
dural practices of an administrative hearing under § 5 of the FTCA
and a judicial proceeding under the Sherman Act.2 To allow for the
greater flexibility required by the practical limitations of the FTC,
the evidentiary and procedural rules are more lenient in an FTC
adjudication under § 5, and thus the procedures used by the FTC are
not the same as those mandated in a judicial trial." The FTC pro-
ceeding is similar to a nonjury case where the evidentiary rules are
relaxed and a trial judge may admit evidence which would be ex-
cluded in a jury trial." However, in judicial proceedings a right to a
trial by jury is guaranteed where legal claims are involved, thereby
allowing the parties an option as to evidentiary rules. The Fifth Cir-
cuit has held that collateral estoppel effect would not be given a
finding of fact when in the prior suit there was no right to jury trial
" 537 F.2d at 74. 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1970). See note 8 supra.
4 537 F.2d at 74. Section 5(a) does not explicitly state that judgments in govern-
ment enforcement actions can only be given prima facie effect, but apparently the
court concludes that the specification of one standard implies the exclusion of all
others. E.g., Continental Casualty Co. v. United States, 314 U.S. 527, 532-33 (1942).
(express statutory provision excludes all other alternative actions). See Note, Section
5(a) of the Clayton Act and Offensive Collateral Estoppel in Antitrust Damage
Actions, 85 YALE L.J. 541, 547-54 (1976).
42 There are two main differences between an FTC proceeding and a civil proceed-
ing before a court. First, the FTC contains both an adjudicative and a prosecutorial
branch. But the danger of possible abuses are minimized by the Rules of Practice of
the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 556 (1970), which provides that investi-
gators and prosecutors never serve as judges in adjudicatory hearings. See also 16
C.F.R. § 3.42(a) (1976); Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955).
The second difference is that hearsay evidence is often admissible in a FTC pro-
ceeding. See 16 C.F.R. § 3.43(b) (1976). A hearing examiner experienced in the law is
deemed able to weigh hearsay evidence correctly. See K. DAvIs, ADmIISTRATivE LAw
TREATISE §§ 14.00-.01 (Supp. 1970). Supposedly, a respondent in an FTC proceeding
is protected against an undue reliance on hearsay testimony by his right to appellate
review. Cf. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229-30 (1938) (appeal from
NLRB administrative hearing).
11 See 16 C.F.R. § 3.1 (1976). See K. DAVIS, ADMInISTRATIVE LAW TEXT, § 8.01 (3d
ed. 1972); Farmington Dowel Prod. Co. v. Forster Mfg. Co., 421 F.2d 61, 73-74 (1st Cir.
1970) (noted that an FTC proceeding includes every major protection provided in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
1 See note 43 supra.
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on this issue, but there was in the subsequent action. 5 Finally, the
burdens of proof are also different in an FTC proceeding." Under the
Sherman Act evidence of fraud must be "clear and convincing;" 7 the
Federal Trade Commission does not apply this evidentiary stan-
dard."
However, this concern with differences in procedure between an
FTC proceeding and a judicial trial appears nebulous when cases
holding that FTC proceedings under the Clayton Act are admissible
as prima facie evidence are considered." Since the same procedures
are used by the FTC under both antitrust actions and § 5 actions, it
seems arbitrary to say that due process is afforded in one case but
denied in the other. Although it would be illogical to accord one order
prima facie effect and the other the absolute effect of collateral estop-
pel as the plaintiffs in Pfizer seemed to request, it is equally illogical
to give prima facie effect to one FTC order and no weight at all to
another depending on what statute it is brought under. 0
In ruling that the FTC hearing on the fraud issue would not have
collateral estoppel effect, the Fourth Circuit stated that it was not
holding that an administrative adjudication could never have collat-
Is Rachal v. Hill, 435 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 904 (1971)
(first proceeding by SEC had no right to jury trial; the court disallowed collateral
estoppel effect in the second action for this reason); but see Crane Co. v. American
Standard, Inc., 490 F.2d 332 (2d Cir. 1973) (jury trial considerations would not limit
the application of collateral estoppel principles). See also Shapiro & Coquillette, The
Fetish of Jury Trial in Civil Cases: A Comment on Rachal v. Hill, 85 HARv. L. Rxv.
442 (1971); Note, Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. Edelstein: The Application of Collateral
Estoppel Principles in Derogation of the Right to Jury Trial, 1974 DUKE L.J. 1970.
" In Azalea Drive-In Theater, Inc. v. Hanft, 540 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1976), the
Fourth Circuit held that a state court determination would have collateral estoppel
effect in a federal court antitrust suit even though the burdens of proof were apparently
different in the courts. Id. at 715. Although the first proceeding in Azalea was in a state
court rather than an administrative agency, the case seems to indicate a lack of con-
cern over burdens of proof being identical and to place more of an emphasis on the
"full and fair" hearing test.
' 537 F.2d at 74 n.14.
" An FTC examiner has discretion in what weight will be given to the evidence.
3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 9815.43 (1976). See Basic Books, Inc. v. FTC, 276 F.2d
718 (7th Cir. 1960).
41 E.g., Farmington Dowel Prod. Co. v. Forester Mfg. Co., 421 F.2d 61, 66-76 (1st
Cir. 1970); New Jersey Wood Finishing Co. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 332 F.2d
346, 352-54 (3rd Cir. 1964), aff'd on other grounds, 381 U.S. 311 (1965); see also In re
Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 317 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
0 Arguably, the reason why prima facie effect is specified for antitrust actions
only is simply that Congress wanted to further enforcement of the antitrust laws more
than the FTCA. See note 13 Section C infra.
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eral estoppel effect.5 1 The implicit implication is that the holding of
the case should be limited to a § 5 FTCA claim. Arguably, had the
FTC hearing been on a claim under the Clayton Act rather than § 5
of the FTCA, the court might have given the FTC hearing greater
weight.52 However, the conclusion may be drawn equally as well that
the court would never have given any weight to an FTC hearing as
long as it was controlled by its current evidentiary and procedural
rules.53 The Pfizer decision has a chilling effect on subsequent cases
concerning the weight to be given regulatory agencies' hearings. Fur-
ther clarification of the Fourth Circuit's position in the Pfizer case
will be necessary before any other administrative agency's decision
will be given prima facie effect.
B. Standard for Injunction Requested by FTC Different From
Trade and Eqitable Standards
In declaring unfair methods of competition and deceptive acts or
practices in or affecting commerce unlawful the FTC's principal con-
sideration is the public interest.' The Commission is authorized to
seek preliminary injunctions of potentially unlawful conduct prior to
final determination in its proceedings to protect this interest.
2
" 537 F.2d at 73.
52 See note 46 supra for cases according an FTC hearing under the antitrust laws
prima facie effect.
'3The argument that FTC actions do not afford due process of law has been
rebutted in recent years. The FTC proceedings, however, have only been given prima
facie weight, which cuts off no defense, involves a full consideraion of all issues and
allows the jury to determine all questions of fact. See Purex Corp. Ltd. v. Proctor &
Gamble Co., 308 F. Supp. 584, 589 (C.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd, 453 F.2d 288 (9th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1065 (1972).
1 Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970). Conduct which vio-
lates the Sherman Act may also be found an "unfair method of competition." FTC v.
Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 693 (1948).
2 Section 13(b) of the FTCA authorizes the Commission to seek an injunction from
the federal courts:
(b) Whenever the Commission has reason to believe-
(1) that any person, partnership, or corporation is violating, or
is about to violate, any provision of law enforced by the Federal Trade
Commission, and
(2) that the enjoining thereof pending the issuance of a com-
plaint by the Commission and until such complaint is dismissed by
the Commission or set aside by the court on review, or until the order
of the Commission made thereon has become final, would be in the
interest of the public .... 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (1970).
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In FTC v. Food Town Stores, Inc. ,3 the FTC sought an injunction
and temporary restraining order4 (TRO) enjoining the merger of
Food Town Stores, Inc. and Lowe's Food Stores, Inc. The FTC al-
leged that the merger would eliminate competition between Food
Town and Lowe's in six cities of North Carolina, increase concentra-
tion in those markets, 5 eliminate competition in other markets, 6 and
increase barriers to entry into the retail food store business 7 in those
markets in violation of § 7 of the Clayton Act' and § 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act Applying the traditional determinative cri-
teria used in private litigation,"0 the district court denied relief, but
3 539 F.2d 1339 (4th Cir. 1976).
'See FED. R. Civ. P. 65. A preliminary injunction, FED. R. Civ. P. 65(a), required
notice to the opposing party and restrains the defendant from the action sought to be
enjoined until the completion of the cause in which it is issued. A temporary restrain-
ing order (FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b)) on the other hand, is generally granted ex parte
and without notice, but only restrains the defendant until the propriety of granting a
temporary injunction can be determined. A TRO is valid only for a 10 day period,
subject to extensions in the court's discretion. E.g., Lawrence v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry. Co.,
274 U.S. 588, 595-96 (1927).
The presidents of Food Town and Lowe's admitted only to some potential con-
centration in "a very limited number of store locations," including the Winston-Salem,
Kannapolis, and Mt. Airy, North Carolina locations, 539 F.2d at 1344.
6 Under the aggregate concentration theory, a merger that joins together capital
resources is presumed to be anticompetitive. Although the market shares of several
firms within their individual markets may remain unchanged in the merger, the capi-
tal resources of the companies become pooled and concentrated into fewer hands, thus
creating an economic power that tends to have monopolistic tendencies. Kennecott
Copper Corp. v. FTC, 467 F.2d 67 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 909 (1974);
see Blake, Conglomerate Mergers and the Antitrust Laws, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 555
(1973); Note, Section 7 of the Clayton Act: Its Application to the Congomerate
Merger, 13 WM. & MARY L. REv. 623 (1972).
' Potential competition which can be blocked by increased barriers to entry, is a
significant check on the exercise of market power by leading firms, as well as the most
likely source of additional actual competition. ANTrrRusT ADviSER, § 4.30 (C. Hills ed.
1971). A merger may be challenged based on the effect that a market entry may have
on the company resulting from the merger. See generally United States v. El Paso
Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964); Disner, Barrier Analysis in Antitrust Law, 58
CORNELL L. REv. 862 (1973).
8 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
9 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970 and Supp. V 1976).
" The usual equities weighed in private litigation are considered extensively in
Long v. Robinson, 432 F.2d 977, 980-81 (4th Cir. 1970) (private citizen's application
for a stay of an order of the district court). A party seeking a stay must show: that he
will likely prevail on the merits of the appeal, that he will suffer irreparable injury if
the stay is denied, that other parties will not be substantially harmed by the stay, and
that the public interest will be served by granting the stay. See Virginia Petroleum
Jobbers Ass'n v. Federal Power Comm'n, 259 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cited with
approval in Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 773 (1968). A stay is granted
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granted a temporary stay to provide the court of appeals sufficient
time to consider and act upon the motion."
Acting for the Fourth Circuit, 2 Judge Winter held that the tradi-
tional equity standards used to evaluate a motion for a preliminary
injunction do not apply to a motion by the FTC under § 13 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act. 3 The court noted that since the FTC
enforces the antitrust laws in the public sector," the public's interest
in maintaining a competitive market should be the standard which
controls FTC requests for injunctions. The court relied on the FTCA
Conference Committee Report, which stated that § 13(b) was in-
tended to maintain the statutory or "public interest" test as the
applicable standard, and not to impose traditional equity stan-
dards. 5
Section 13 codified the decisional law6 which defined the judicial
role in determining the proper showing required for issuing an injunc-
tion under 15 U.S.C. § 53(a), as requiring the exercise of independent
judgment on the part of the court. Judge Winter construed the stat-
ute as prescribing two standards as prerequisites for a TRO to issue.
7
First, the FTC must show a likelihood of success on its action, and
second, the action must be in the public interest.
The Supreme Court, considering the likelihood of success require-
ment in United States v. Philadelphia National Bank,'" held that
in the discretion of a court under FED. R. Civ. P. 62, and halts "any proceedings to
enforce a judgment pending the disposition of a motion for a new trial." FED. R. Civ.
P. 62(b). Subdivision (c) of Rule 62 governs the suspending, modifying, restoring, or
granting of an injunction during the pendency of an appeal. The threshold criteria for
the issuance of a stay or subsection (c) injunction are the same as those in the issuance
of a temporary restraining order of preliminary injunction in private litigation.
" 539 F.2d at 1341.
12 Because a full panel of the Fourth Circuit could not be convened in time to hear
and decide the motion, Judge Winter decided the case as a single circuit judge. A single
judge of a court of appeals, or a single Justice of the United States Supreme Court,
may grant a restraining order to preserve the status quo pending an appeal and the
power may be exercised even though no appeal has been perfected. In re President &
Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1007 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
978 (1964).
13 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (Supp. V 1975).
" 15 U.S.C. § 45 (Supp. V 1975).
" 539 F.2d at 1343. CONFERENCE COMM. REP. No. 93-924, 93d Cong., 1st Sess,
reprinted in [1973] 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2533.
11 FTC v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 317 F.2d 669 (2d Cir. 1963); FTC v. National Health
Aids, Inc., 108 F. Supp. 340 (D. Md. 1952).
27 539 F.2d at 1344.
1" 374 U.S. 321 (1963) (the test for concentration was whether a consumer had
alternative sources conveniently available to him).
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where a merger results in a significant increase in the concentration
of firms in a market, the defendant has the burden of proving that
the merger would not have anti-competitive effects."9 The Court ruled
there was a presumption that the merger must be enjoined in the
absence of evidence showing the merger is not likely to have such
anticompetitive effects.
2 0
The Fourth Circuit construed the Philadelphia National rationale
to mean that FTC success should be presumed when it presents facts
indicating an increase in market concentration unless the defendants
produced evidence to rebut this presumption. Since the FTC showed
the merger between Food Town and Lowe's would increase the mar-
ket concentration in at least three areas,2 1 the burden was on the
defendants to prove that the merger would not decrease competition.
On defendants' failure to do SO, 22 the court concluded that the FTC
satisfied the first test.Y
Next, the court ruled that since the public interest is served by
insuring a competitive market in the food retailing business and since
the defendants could not prove the merger would not have anticom-
petitive effects, the second test for issuance of an injunction was
satisfied.2 4 The court rejected the defendants' argument that the
11 Id. at 363.
2o Id.
21 The FTC presented statistical evidence showing that in at least three geographi-
cal areas the grocery business would incur a significant increase in market concentra-
tion or result in a near-monopoly with substantial increases in the market share con-
trolled by the combined firms. Both firms have been aggressive competitors in the past.
Since 1972, Lowe's has opened markets in three cities in which Food Town operated,
and Food Town has opened stores in two cities in which Lowe's operated. Food Town's
sales have grown by 160% since 1972 and Lowe's sales by 123%, while industry sales
advanced only 57% in the same period. If the merger were allowed, the market share
of the chain in Winston-Salem would be 11.0%, in Kannapolis it would be 28.6%, and
in Mt. Airy, the combined share of the market would increase to 72.5%. 539 F.2d at
1344-45.
2 Food Town and Lowe's made two countervailing arguments. The court rejected
the "failing company" defense. Under this defense, the FTC or the Justice Department
will not challenge a merger it might ordinarily have if there is evidence that one of the
parties to the proposed merger is in serious danger of failing and that reasonable efforts
have been made to find an alternative purchaser without success. See United States
v. Greater Buffalo Press, Inc., 402 U.S. 549 (1971). The court found that while Lowe's
might have substantial short-term liabilities, its financial statements showed it to be
solvent and profit-making. 539 F.2d at 1345.
n 539 F.2d at 1345.
20 Id. at 1346. The court rejected the defendant's claim that the competitive over-
laps between the two businesses were very slight and could be cured by divestiture.
Divestiture refers to liquidation of the illegally acquired market power reflected in
certain assets. When a merger has occurred which violates the antitrust laws or tends
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merger was in the public interest because it might result in lower food
prices.2 Since Food Town was not required to lower prices, the public
interest in lower prices would be better protected through competi-
tion. Thus, the court ruled that the TRO should issue. 6
The injunction in the Food Town case was obtained under § 13(b),
which was expanded in 1973 to extend the Commission's authority
to seek preliminary injunctions against violations of any laws which
the FTC enforces.Y There have been no other district court cases
concerning § 13(b) decided since the amendments. This preliminary
injunction power was previously applied only to the FTC's regulation
of false or misleading advertising now covered by § 13(c). The tests
applied by the Fourth Crcuit in Food Town appear identical to the
tests applied in false advertising cases fomerly covered by § 13(b).
That these are the same tests which cover misleading advertising
is confirmed by false advertising cases decided since the 1973
changes.2 The discussion of new § 13(b) in these cases upholds the
tests applied by the Fourth Circuit allowing the FTC to obtain an
injunction. Although there has been no other decision by a court of
appeals on § 13(b), since the FTC was created to prevent and prose-
cute unfair trade practices which might become antitrust violations,
the Fourth Circuit's decision furthers congressional antitrust policy
by simplifying the prosecution of alleged antitrust violators.
29
to have monopolistic implications, the government may seek divestiture of some of the
company's assets. See United States v. Greater Buffalo Press, Inc., 402 U.S. 549 (1971).
The court further noted that whether the markets in which the firms compete are small
is irrelevant under the Clayton Act and does not affect the legality of the merger. Judge
Winter ruled that while divestiture might be the ultimate remedy, "under § 13(b) of
the FTCA, [the] FTC is entitled to preserve the status quo pending adjudication."
539 F.2d at 1345.
The Fourth Circuit also rejected the argument that private injuries which might
result from delaying this merger were proper considerations for withholding injunctive
relief under § 13(b). The court reasoned that "public interest" did not include "private
interests." Id. at 1346.
" 539 F.2d at 1346.
2 Id. at 1347.
v 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1970).
2 Two cases decided under 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (Supp. V. 1975) mention the 1973
changes and discuss the applicable tests under both §§ 13(b) & 13(c). FTC v. Simeon
Mgt. Corp., 391 F. Supp. 697, 699-701 (N.D. Cal. 1975), alf'd, 532 F.2d 708 (9th Cir.
1976) (commission showed insufficient likelihood of success to obtain injunction to
restrain weight reduction clinics from advertising their treatments if they used a drug
unapproved by the FDA); FTC v. National Comm'n on Egg Nutrition, 517 F.2d 485
(7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 919 (1976) (commission showed an injunction
would be in the best interest of the public where advertisements were materially
misleading).
" See note 13 Section C infra.
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C. Rebuttable Presumption for Class Action Where There is
Violation of the Sherman Act
Class actions have two purposes: to allow litigation of multiple
claims in a single action, which avoids multiple suits and the possibil-
ity of inconsistent individual judgments; and to provide vindication
of small claims which might not otherwise be litigated because of the
small amount of damages involved.1 In antitrust suits, class actions
are particularly appropriate because they allow similarly situated
victims of antitrust violations to pool their claims in a single law suit.
2
This pooling results in a larger recovery and thus permits a case too
expensive for one individual to be litigated.
In Windham v. American Brands, Inc.,3 six named growers of
tobacco in South Carolina brought a class action against seven defen-
dant tobacco companies and the Secretary of Agriculture alleging a
conspiracy in violation of the Sherman Act to lower prices, to monop-
olize warehouse auction markets,to restrict the amount of tobacco
sold from those warehouses per day, and to distribute inspectors dis-
proportionately throughout Georgia and South Carolina.' After allow-
ing full discovery and pre-trial investigation, the district judge con-
cluded that the case should not proceed as a class action. 5 Although
plaintiffs6 met the criteria for establishing a class action under Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a), the court held they did not satisfy
the criteria of 23(b)(3), because individual issues would predominate
E.g., Hohmann v. Packard Instrument Co., 399 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1968);Buch-
holtz v. Swift & Co., 62 F.R.D. 581 (D. Minn. 1973); Note, Rule 23(b)(3) Class Action:
An Empirical Study, 62 GEO. L.J. 1123 (1974).
2 Not only are the victims assured compensation for their injuries, but class ac-
tions allow an antitrust violator to be confronted with the entire amount of the harm
he has inflicted. This aggregation of claims against him necessarily increases the deter-
rent impact of the antitrust laws. See note 13 infra.
539 F.2d 1016 (4th Cir. 1976).
Id. at 1617.
Windham v. American Brands, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 641, 660 (D.S.C. 1975).
There were six named plaintiffs, growers of flue-cured tobacco in South Caro-
lina, seeking to represent more than 20,000 South Carolinians who, from 1970 through
1974, sold or had an economic interest in the sale of flue-cured tobacco in South
Carolina, and whose total claims aggregated amounted to more than $335,000,000. 539
F.2d at 1018.
7 In holding that this action met the requirements of FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a), the
district court found that: (1) there was no question that joinder of all 20,000 members
of the class would be impossible, (2) there were common questions of law and fact, i.e.
whether the defendants violated the antitrust laws, and (3) the typicality and represen-
tativeness of the named plaintiffs could be reconciled without destruction of the class.
The court suggested that the provision for subclasses in Rule 23(c)(4)(B) be used to
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over common ones.8 Moreover, there was no theoretical or practical
workable formula which could be used to prove damages sustained
by each particular class member.' The court dismissed all complain-
ants except the six named plaintiffs, entered a final judgment against
those dismissed"0 and certified" this judgment to the Court of Ap-
peals.
The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's decision not to
allow the suit to proceed as a class action.'2 The court of appeals
reasoned that 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) evidenced a public policy to simplify
antitrust actions and to aid victims of antitrust violations.' 3 This
statute provides that a judgment in favor of the government in an
antitrust action is available in private litigation as prima facie evi-
dence of a violation of the antitrust laws.'4 The Fourth Circuit con-
cluded that the judiciary, in keeping with this policy, should apply
the statute not only in situations expressly covered by the legislative
act, but also in analogous situations where the policy considerations
separate opposing views and eliminate antagonists so the provisions of Rule 23(a) could
be met. Although the court noted the availability of the opt-out provisions of Rule
23(c)(2), it specifically rejected application of this rule to remedy the specific problems
of this case. 68 F.R.D. at 648-50. See Note, 10 IDAHO L. REV. 287 (1974).
The district court found on an evaluation of the relationship between the com-
mon and individual issues that the criteria for Rule 23(b)(3) could not be met, 68
F.R.D. at 655. See generally 7A C. WmoHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE: CIVIL § 1778 (2d ed. 1975). This conclusion was based on findings relating to the
large amount of evidence which would be required to prove the fact of impact of the
alleged conspiracy on each of the 20,000 proposed members of the class and the facts
of the specific damage each had sustained. 68 F.R.D. at 653-55.
68 F.R.D. at 654.
, Id. at 660. The court further noted that no expert could qualify to give opinions
concerning all the damage issues in the case. Thus, the district court concluded that
a great amount of evidence would be required to prove damages for each member of
the class. The court rejected the idea of bifurcating the action because the problems
of manageability as to determination of damages were such that plaintiffs' claim of a
class action should be denied. Id. at 658-59.
" 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970).
,2 The Fourth Circuit found that the lower court did not draw a sufficiently sharp
distinction between issues of the alleged violation of the antitrust laws and issues
concerning damages. The appellate court noted that the antagonisms of interest among
the plaintiffs would not prove that defendants did nor did not conspire, but would bear
chiefly upon the measure of the impacts of the conspiracies, if any existed. 539 F.2d
at 1021-22.
,1 Id. at 1021. The basis for the policy of simplifying antitrust litigation appears
to be congressional sympathy for the usually small enterprise or individual against the
ordinarily large malfactor. See generally M. GREEN, B. MOORE & B. WiSSERSTEiN, THE
CLOSED ENTERPRISE SYSTEM 215 (1972).
"1 See note 8 Section A supra.
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are similar. 5 The court analogized the effect of § 16(a) to the effect
of determining the issue of alleged antitrust violations in a "master
suit," and then allowing determination of damages in separate
trials.16 Since the plaintiffs' recovery route would be shortened if the
defendants' liability was determined in one suit, the court inquired
only whether there would be a substantial difference in the quantum
or character of the proof necessary for plaintiffs to prove defendants'
liability." The court concluded that where only a minimal differ-
ernce in the type of evidence required to show defendants' liability
exists, these individuals should be permitted to proceed as a class.
The issue of damages should not be considered by the court because
although the liability issues are identical for all plaintiffs, the damage
issues may differ widely in requisite proof and impact.
Other circuits have also recognized that difficulties in calculating
individual damages should not defeat class action.' These decisions
reason that where wrongful conduct has resulted in identifiable loss,
differences in damages should not prevent the suit since class actions
often provide the only route available for the vindication of small
claims. Many courts have been more willing to allow class actions
despite individual differences in damages where individual damages
may be calculated by a standard formula.
The Windham court found that no unusual complexities would be
involved in this case so long as only the issues of antitrust violations
were before the court and thus certified the case as a class action. The
Fourth Circuit held that if the conspiracies could not be proved, the
case would be dismissed. If the conspiracies could be proved, how-
ever, the district court was then to decide whether there should be
one mass trial or several trials with plaintiffs grouped in subclasses
which meet the standards of Rule 23(b)(3) to determine each plain-
tiff's damages.20
'1 539 F.2d at 1021.
" Id.
'I Id. at 1019.
" E.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 566-67 (2d Cir. 1968), rev'd
on other grounds, 417 U.S. 156 (1974); In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp.
278 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Illinois v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 484, 489
(N.D. Ill. 1969); Minnesota v. United States Steel Corp., 44 F.R.D. 559 (D. Minn.
1968); Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Amer. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452 (E.D. Pa.
1968).
" See, e.g., Link v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Amer., Inc., 1975-2 TPADE CAS. (CCH)
60,534 (E.D. Pa. 1975); In re Master Key Antitrust Litigation, 1975-1 Tswz CAs.
(CCH)' 60,377 (D. Conn. 1975); City of New York v. General Motors Corp., 60 F.R.D.
393 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), appeal dismissed, 501 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1974).
" 539 F.2d at 1022. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4) (A) provides that where there is at least
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This decision indicates a more liberal philosophy regarding the
manageability of a class action where antitrust claims are involved.
The Fourth Circuit apparently established a rebuttable presumption
that a class action should be allowed in antitrust cases. Support for
this presumption is indicated by the recent increase in class actions
in the antitrust area. These decisions have consistently been based
on the practical realities of the ability of small and dispersed victims
of antitrust violations to maintain individual claims.2'
Although determination of liability in a class action may be.less
of an imposition upon judicial resources than thousands of individual
suits, this reasoning does not consider the practical manageability
problems still remaining in any large class action. 2 Recent Supreme
Court casesP indicate that one of the Court's major concerns is the
practical manageability of class actions. Thus, although the Fourth
Circuit permitted the suit to proceed as a class action, it may have
done so at the expense of manageability, a judicial concern of equal
weight with the policy favoring antitrust plaintiffs.
JEAN L. BYASSEE
one common issue appropriate for class action treatment, as long as the other require-
ments for a class action under Rule 23 are met, a partial class action may be brought
as to that common issue despite other individual issues. 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1790 (2d ed. 1975).
21 529 F.2d at 1021. This same analysis also has been held to apply to securities
cases. See, e.g., Grad V. Memorex Corp., 61 F.R.D. 88 (N.D. Cal. 1973); Green v.
Occidental Petroleum Corp., FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,397 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
2 Some courts, however, have held that the size of a class does not preclude its
manageability. See, e.g., Philadelphia v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 45 (D.N.J. 1971).
21 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417"U.S. 156 (1974) (wherever possible,class mem-
bers are required to be individually notified at the expense of plaintiff class representa-
tive); Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973) (each member of class of
multiple plaintiffs must satisfy jurisdictional amounts for suits in federal court). For
a discussion of the impact of these cases, see Shenefield, Annual Survey of Antitrust
Developments-Class Actions, Mergers, and Market Definition: A New Trend Toward
Neutrality, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 299, 301-21 (1975).
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